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21 ARMY GROUP

**SOME NOTES ON THE
CONDUCT OF WAR
AND
THE INFANTRY DIVISION
IN BATTLE**

This pamphlet must NOT fall into enemy hands. Officers in possession of a copy will be responsible for its safe custody.

**BELGIUM.
NOVEMBER, 1944.**

To: Miles Howard

in the hopes that he will
enjoy his stay at the Staff
College and possibly find
this pamphlet of use.

B. L. Montgomery
Field - Marshal.

25-11-44

Introduction

THERE are many of us who have had considerable experience of active fighting during the last few years, and have seen service in many countries.

But in the busy life we lead there is seldom time or opportunity to record our experiences in a form which will be of real value to others.

2. I consider there is a definite need for firm guidance in the handling of the different types of formations we have in our Army. This short pamphlet is the first of a series I propose to issue. It gives some brief notes on the conduct of war, and then deals with the Infantry Division.

3. The more fighting I see, the more I am convinced that the big thing in war is morale; that word appears frequently in this pamphlet.

Commanders must constantly talk to the troops under their command; the more that troops can see their commanders, hear them talk, and be put "in the picture" by them, the higher will be their morale. A commander must constantly study the state of morale, so that he may seize the right psychological moment to initiate a series of talks to his troops.

B. L. Montgomery

Field-Marshal,
C-in-C,
21 Army Group.

Belgium.
November, 1944.

SOME NOTES ON
THE CONDUCT
OF WAR

B. R. Sargent

21 June 1918
Camp
Camp

SOME NOTES ON THE CONDUCT OF WAR

1. A war is won by victories in battle. No victories will be gained unless commanders will sort out clearly in their own minds those essentials which are vital for success, and will ensure that those things form the framework on which all action is based.
2. There are certain points which are fundamental; they are important always, and to neglect any of them will probably lead to failure; they will apply, in a greater or lesser degree, to all commanders at all times.

THE BASIC FUNDAMENTALS

3. I give below those points which, in my opinion, are fundamental and are vital for success. Close attention to these points has paid me a good dividend, and I commend them to all commanders. I consider that these points form the principles of modern war.

Air Power

4. It is necessary to win the air battle before embarking on the land, or sea, battle. If this is not done, then operations on the land or on the sea will be conducted at a great disadvantage.
5. It is not possible to conduct successful offensive operations on land against an enemy with a superior air force, other things being equal. The enemy's air forces must be subdued before the land battle is launched.
6. Fire support from the air is dependent on the weather. The overall plan must aim at winning the battle with the fire support available from the ground, especially when time is important and you cannot wait; if the air support becomes available it is a good bonus, and enables you to win quicker and with less casualties.

There will be occasions when fire support from the air is essential for success; you then require good weather and must wait for it.

Administration

7. Administrative arrangements in rear must have a very definite relation to what it is intended to achieve in front. A force which outstrips its maintenance may find itself in a highly precarious condition.

Morale

8. Morale is probably the most important single factor in war.

A high morale is based on discipline, self-respect, and confidence of the soldier in his commanders and in his weapons. Without a high morale, no success can be achieved—however good may be the strategic or tactical plan, or anything else.

9. A high morale is a pearl of very great price. And the surest way to obtain it is by success in battle.

The Initiative

10. It is necessary to gain quickly, and to keep, the initiative. Only in this way will the enemy be made to dance to your tune, and to react to your thrusts.

11. Throughout the battle area the whole force must be so well balanced, and poised, that there will never be any need to react to enemy thrusts; these can then be disregarded, and the battle forced relentlessly to swing your way.

12. Every commander must understand very clearly that without the initiative he cannot win.

Surprise

13. Strategic surprise may often be difficult to obtain. But tactical surprise is always possible, and must always be given a foremost place in the planning.

Concentration

14. A sure way to victory is to concentrate great force at the selected place at the right time, and to smash the enemy.

Dispersion of effort, and of resources, is fatal to success.

Co-operation

15. Successful battle operations depend on the intimate co-operation of all arms; no one arm, alone and unaided, can do any good in battle.

Simplicity

16. The first requirement of a simple plan is that each component part of the force should have its own task to carry out, and its operations should not be dependent on the success of other formations or units. Once complications creep in, then troubles arise.

OTHER IMPORTANT POINTS

17. There will be other points which are important; but these will not necessarily be important always, and they will vary with the rank of the commander. For instance, a Divisional Commander will pay attention to points which would hardly affect a company or battery commander.

18. Every commander, however senior or however junior, must be clear as to the points which matter on his own level; and he must be able to judge quickly whether his subordinate commanders are directing their energies correctly in this respect.

19. The great art is to be able to grasp rapidly the essentials of a military problem, to do something about it quickly, and to see that other people also do a good deal about it *very* quickly.

THE CHAPLAINS

20. I do not believe that a commander can inspire great armies, or single units, or individual men, and lead them to achieve great victories, unless he has a proper sense of religious truth.

21. The importance of good Senior Chaplains is immense; and under them the chaplains must be welded into a team, all singing the same song and to the proper tune.

22. Facilities are provided for combatant officers to go to schools of instruction, where they are refreshed in their duties and work.

It is definitely essential that similar facilities should be provided for chaplains, at the public expense; they become in need of spiritual refreshment just as much as the combatant officer becomes in need of tactical or technical instruction, and they must have it.

The organization of such facilities is the special responsibility of the staff.

23. It should be clearly realized by all commanders that a thoroughly sound and healthy chaplains department is a very definite aid towards success in battle.

THE HUMAN FACTOR

24. In war it is the man that counts, and not only the machine.

A good tank is useless unless the team inside it is well trained, and the men in that team have stout hearts and enthusiasm for the fight; so it is in all other cases.

With good men, anything is possible.

25. A commander has at his disposal certain human material; what he can do with that material will depend entirely on himself. He must gain the complete trust and confidence of his men. There is no book of rules which will help him in this matter; each commander will adopt his own methods, and ones best suited to his own make-up. Success in battle will produce quick results; all soldiers will follow a successful general.

26. Probably one of the most important requirements in a commander is that he must be a good judge of men. He must be able to choose as his subordinates men of ability and character who will inspire confidence in others.

27. It is necessary to remember that all divisions are different; some are good at one type of battle, others are good at another type of battle; the art lies in knowing what each division is best at, and having the right divisions in the right place at the right time.

It is the same with commanders in their several ranks; one is best at this, another at that; you require the right commander in the right place at the right time.

THE ORGANIZATION OF ARMIES

28. In a modern army we have:
 Infantry Divisions.
 Armoured Divisions.
 Independent Armoured Brigades.
 Army Groups, R.A.
 etc.,
 etc.

GROUPING FOR BATTLE

29. In his plan of battle the higher commander must give careful thought to the correct grouping of his divisions, his armour, his artillery, and other resources.

He cannot decide on this grouping until the problem has emerged and he has decided how he will solve it; he must then so group his divisions, his armour, and his artillery, that Corps—who have to fight the tactical battle—are suitably composed for their respective tasks.

As the battle proceeds he may frequently re-group.

30. Skill in grouping, and in quick re-grouping to meet the changing tactical situation, plays a large part in successful battle operations.

It is a great art, and requires much study before proficiency is attained.

31. A Corps HQ must be able to handle armoured divisions, or infantry divisions, or any combination of the two types.

32. The surest way to victory is to develop the full fighting power of divisions on Corps plans, the whole being directed in accordance with the Army plan.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF DIVISIONS

33. It is obvious that all commanders must have a good knowledge of the employment in battle of the different types of divisions, and must understand the employment and handling of armour and of artillery.

34. The following pages contain a brief survey of the infantry division, and draw attention to those points which must receive consideration if the division is to fight successfully in battle.

THE INFANTRY DIVISION IN BATTLE

AS THE EMPLOYMENT OF SECTIONS

34. The following pages contain a brief sketch of the employment and handling of various and of different types of sections and units and the knowledge of the employment of the battle of the division in the command and control of the battle.

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THE DIVISIONAL COMMANDER

1. A Divisional Commander must have certain personal qualities if he is to command successfully in battle. He must have qualities of leadership, he must have initiative, and he must have the drive to get things done and to get the last ounce out of tired troops. He must have that moral courage, that resolution, and that determination which will enable him to stand fast when the issue hangs in the balance. He must be cheerful at all times and under all conditions, and radiate confidence in the outcome of any operation.

2. His first task is to create "atmosphere," and in that atmosphere his staff, his subordinate commanders and his troops will live, and work, and fight.

His Division must know what he wants and his method of working. It must be given firm guidance and a clear lead.

3. A Divisional Commander has a unique opportunity to influence personally the morale of his Division. The surest way to get a high morale is to instil confidence. If the troops have complete confidence in their Commander, then all is well, since they know that he will see to everything.

He should be known to as many as possible of all ranks serving under him. This can best be achieved by short talks to all ranks during periods out of action on subjects which he wishes to put across himself, by frequent visits to Brigades and units both in and out of action, and by personal messages on special occasions.

If every man in the Division can be made to feel that he is a member of one happy and successful family, and that the honour and good name of his unit and of the Division are worthy of any sacrifice which he may be asked to make, a Commander can

be sure that his Division will respond to every call made upon it.

4. A Commander should pay particular attention to the discipline of his Division. Good discipline is a potent factor in steadiness and tenacity in battle, and without it little success will be achieved.
5. The maintenance of the offensive spirit of a Division is one of the primary tasks of its Commander. He must ensure that they never settle down to a policy of "live and let live". In defence particularly, any tendency to be satisfied with an attitude of *laissez faire* will inevitably lead to enemy domination of the area and invite subsequent disaster. To guard against this, the Commander should be continually thinking how he can rest and relieve his troops and provide some change and relaxation for them. The more difficult the conditions the more necessary this becomes. He must also carefully watch his subordinate Commanders for any signs of overstrain, or staleness, in order that he may rest or replace them before it is too late.

ORGANIZATION OF THE DIVISION

6. The present organization has, with only minor changes, stood up well to the many and varied requirements of this war in vastly different conditions of ground and climate. It is generally sound and has proved its value.
7. Local conditions will, at times, require a temporary alteration of the existing organization. This should be made as necessary by the Divisional Commander from his own resources. Permanent changes should be made only when new equipment and tactics make them universally necessary.

Constant changes cause confusion and loss of efficiency, both tactically and administratively.

ROLES IN BATTLE

8. The ultimate object of the destruction of the enemy forces in the field can be achieved only after hard and prolonged fighting, in which fighting the Infantry Division will play a major part. The Infantry Division has many roles in battle, but by far the most important is its attack upon, and break into, and through, a main enemy defensive area. This will entail a hard slogging match with great calls for stamina, fortitude, and endurance on the part of all ranks of all Arms in the Division. In battle, attack and defence alternate. It is not possible to attack all day and all night, and when resting, or regrouping for another phase, the Division must quickly assume such defensive measures as are suitable. All defence must be aggressive and threatening; a defended area is a firm base from which to develop offensive action—by fire—or by movement—or both, as suitable to the conditions of the moment.
 9. THE PRINCIPAL ROLES OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION ARE:—
 - (a) THE SETPIECE ATTACK TO BREAK INTO, OR THROUGH, A MAIN ENEMY DEFENSIVE AREA.
 - (b) THE FOLLOW-UP OF AN ENEMY FORCE WITHDRAWING.
 - (c) THE ASSAULT CROSSING OF A WATER OBSTACLE.
 - (d) TEMPORARY DEFENCE.
 - (e) THE ASSAULT LANDING ON AN ENEMY HELD COAST.

TACTICAL HANDLING

10. The special technique which a Division adopts to deal with any problem will vary according to the following:—

- (a) The type of country; this may be open plains, mountains, very close country such as the Normandy bocage, towns, etc.
- (b) The state of training and the general calibre of the troops.
- (c) The outside resources available to support the operation.

It is most dangerous to seek for a code of tactics which will meet "the normal battle". There is no such thing as a "normal battle"; every battle is different. But in all types of operations there are certain basic points which will form the framework of the action to be taken; and so long as these points receive attention, then the plan will be on the right lines. It is these basic points which must therefore be well understood.

11. The Commander should ask himself what are the things that really matter, that form the basis of the whole operation, that *must* be got right.

THE BASIC POINTS OF ANY OPERATION

12. (a) PERSONAL COMMAND, AND GOOD INTER-COMMUNICATION.
- (b) KEEP YOUR FIRE POWER CONCENTRATED UNDER CENTRALIZED CONTROL WHENEVER POSSIBLE.
- (c) IN ALL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ENDEAVOUR TO HIT HARD ON A NARROW FRONT AND KEEP ON HITTING. PENETRATE DEEPLY, AND

THEN TURN OUTWARDS, i.e. THE SCHWERPUNKT AND THE AUFROLLEN. THE MOMENTUM OF THE ATTACK MUST BE KEPT UP AT ALL COSTS.

- (d) FIGHT YOUR BRIGADES AS BRIGADES, WITH DEFINITE TASKS AND CLEAR CUT OBJECTIVES.
- (e) ROADS AND CENTRES OF COMMUNICATION ARE VITAL. OPEN THEM UP FOR YOURSELF; DENY THEM TO THE ENEMY.
- (f) YOU MUST HAVE 100% CO-OPERATION BETWEEN ALL ARMS FOR SUCCESS IN BATTLE.
- (g) CONTROL, WHICH DEPENDS UPON GOOD COMMUNICATIONS.
- (h) HAVE GOOD MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS.
- (i) ORGANIZE THE DIVISIONAL AREA CAREFULLY AND SO AVOID MUDDLE.

Both in attack and defence, a great battle winning factor is the concentrated fire of artillery correctly applied to the enemy.

THE SETPIECE ATTACK

13. The Commander must seek to dominate the enemy before he launches his attack. Active and aggressive infantry patrolling and sniping will ensure that he retains the initiative, and will provide one of the most important sources of information about enemy strength, dispositions, defences, and morale.

By study of maps and air photos, and by reconnaissance of the ground, he will then be in a position to make his PLAN, which must be simple. He will decide to what extent to soften up the enemy by preliminary artillery and air bombardment, and whether to attack by night or day.

The Basic Points

14. (a) THE ATTACK MUST BE ORGANIZED IN DEPTH.
- (b) THE START LINE MUST BE SECURE.
- (c) THE ATTACK MUST BE "SEEN IN" BY FIRE.
- (d) ASSAULTING INFANTRY AND TANKS MUST KEEP CLOSE UP TO THE FIRE.
- (e) SUPPORTING WEAPONS MUST GET FORWARD QUICKLY.
- (f) THE IMPETUS OF THE ADVANCE MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO DIE DOWN.

15. Depth in the attack is necessary for two main reasons.

First: to maintain the momentum of the attack; fresh troops must be ready to go through, even if the first attacking troops have not got all their objectives. An attack should always aim at deep penetration to over-run enemy mortar and gun positions.

Second: to mop up in the wake of the assaulting infantry and tanks; this mopping up must follow very quickly, and be thorough.

16. If the start line is not secure the whole plan of attack will be in danger of complete failure; a "dog-fight" may develop for the start line and the fire plan will not be designed to cope with this; the deployment of the assaulting troops will probably be seriously delayed and interfered with.

17. The assaulting troops must be assisted forward by all available support from artillery, mortars, machine guns and the air. This fire will aim at covering all known or likely enemy localities, including those which can support the defenders by fire from flank and rear.

The defence must be shaken and stunned by fire or bombing. The battle-field must be isolated.

18. Great fire power is useless unless the assaulting troops are able to take quick advantage of it. Infantry and tanks must be right up to their supporting fire and ready to go in immediately it lifts, and so over-run the defence before the latter can get its "second wind".

19. The first aim of an attack is to capture ground, the second to hold it. Supporting weapons must be got up quickly to help in reorganization. Initially the tank is the best weapon as it has fire power and mobility. But A Tk guns must be got forward quickly so as to free the tanks, and allow them to be rallied in not less than squadron packets. These are then available to deal with counter-attacks, and for a further mobile and defensive role.

20. It is only by continuous pressure that a breakthrough can be achieved. Once the attack has started, the enemy must be given no respite in which to reorganize and collect reserves.

Fresh formations should be constantly moving up ready to move through the leading troops so that the momentum of the attack may be maintained relentlessly by day and night.

21. Night advances and movements in the dark of all natures can be very much assisted by the use of "Movement Lights", i.e. Searchlights shining at an angle of approx. 10° over the heads of the advancing troops. One searchlight can give illumination equal to a bright moonlight night, for a distance of 6 miles and to a width of 1 mile.

THE FOLLOW UP OF AN ENEMY FORCE WITHDRAWING

22. The object of the enemy will be to impose delay, to prevent a breakthrough from disorganizing his withdrawal, and to gain time to organize his next

main defensive area. He will attempt to do this with mines, with demolitions, and with fire.

The Basic Points

23. (a) THREATEN THE ENEMY FLANKS AND ALWAYS BE PREPARED TO BY-PASS WITH THE LEADING TROOPS.
- (b) KEEP TOUCH.
- (c) SMASH THROUGH ON A NARROW FRONT.
- (d) ALL AVAILABLE ARTILLERY INCLUDING MEDIUM SHOULD BE WELL FORWARD.
- (e) DRIVE HARD THROUGH TO SEIZE IMPORTANT COMMUNICATION CENTRES AND THUS CAUSE THE ENEMY RESISTANCE TO DISINTEGRATE.

24. A retreating enemy force is always frightened of encirclement and is particularly sensitive to any out-flanking movement. Though all centres of enemy resistance must eventually be reduced so as to open the axis, the leading troops should always attempt to by-pass these localities and leave the clearing up to be done by subsequent echelons of troops.

25. It is vital to ensure that the enemy is not allowed to slip away behind cover of small, but determined, rear-guards. Vigorous patrolling should be coupled, if necessary, with a series of carefully staged company attacks.

These will give early information of his intention.

26. All available fire power should be concentrated to smash through on one Brigade axis, and the RE resources concentrated to open up the axis.

A succession of rapid hard hitting punches will be necessary, first with one battalion, then with another.

The launching of the second attack should not be abandoned just because the first one has not fully succeeded.

27. The Divisional artillery under the control of the CRA, 4.2" mortars, and medium machine guns should be well forward to give the maximum support to each punch. Medium artillery must be well forward to shoot up the roads, and disorganize the enemy withdrawal.

28. The enemy will rely upon certain centres of communication through which his tracked and wheeled vehicles must pass. The early capture of these will make his withdrawal so difficult that it becomes a rout. Once they are captured, the enemy can be attacked in the flank where he is always vulnerable. The protection of the Divisional main axis is very important in this phase.

THE ASSAULT CROSSING OF A WATER OBSTACLE

29. Rivers and canals form good delaying obstacles, and the enemy will attempt to make full use of them.

The first aim of the Divisional Commander will be to seize a bridge intact, and so press and harry the enemy that he is unable to make any effective stand.

When this is not possible, a deliberate attack will have to be organized to cross the obstacle, form a bridgehead, and build a bridge.

The Basic Points

30. (a) DETAILED RECONNAISSANCE OF THE OBSTACLE IS NECESSARY TO SELECT INFANTRY CROSSING PLACES AND BRIDGING SITES.

- (b) THE INFANTRY CROSSING SHOULD BE ON A WIDE FRONT.
- (c) THE INFANTRY BRIDGEHEAD MUST BE DEEP ENOUGH TO COVER THE BRIDGING SITES FROM AIMED SMALL ARMS FIRE.
- (d) ANTI-TANK GUNS MUST BE GOT ACROSS EARLY.
- (e) THERE MUST BE CAREFUL ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF ALL TROOPS AND STORES CROSSING THE RIVER.

31. The close defence of a water obstacle along its whole length requires so many troops that it will seldom be possible. It will be the aim of reconnaissance by patrols to find suitable infantry crossing places, which are not closely defended, so that the initial crossing may achieve surprise. Very early RE reconnaissance of the bridging site is essential, to ensure that it is the most suitable available.

32. The infantry crossing should be made on a wide front. Reserves should be centrally placed so that they can be switched to the most successful crossing place.

33. Work on the bridge can begin only when the area is free from enemy small arms fire. In this connection, it is most important to mop up thoroughly all houses, woods, etc., near the bridging site *on both sides of the river* as well as to secure the ground which forms the infantry bridgehead objective.

34. The enemy will counter-attack with all his available reserves to drive the infantry back before the bridge can be built. As in every other form of attack, it is of vital importance to get supporting arms, and particularly anti-tank guns, across the obstacle as early as possible.

35. When boats and rafts are alone available, and when the bridge is first opened, it will be possible to put across the water only a limited number of troops, and of equipment and stores. Priorities must be carefully worked out beforehand, known to all, and enforced. Good traffic control is very necessary, and it must begin well before the bridge is reached.

TEMPORARY DEFENCE

36. All defence is temporary, and the prelude to offensive action from the ground defended, or elsewhere.

All defence must be aggressive, both to mislead the enemy, and to retain the high morale of our own troops.

Vigorous offensive patrolling and sniping, coupled with the offensive use of supporting artillery, mortars, and machine guns, will enable the Commander to retain the initiative, and keep the enemy at arm's length. The Commander and his subordinates should be continually thinking out new "devilments" to harry the enemy.

The Basic Points

- 37. (a) LOCALITIES MUST BE CONCEALED. THIS IS THE FIRST CONSIDERATION.
- (b) A SCREEN OF FORWARD TROOPS MUST COVER THE MAIN AND VITAL CENTRES.
- (c) CONTROL OF ARTILLERY MUST BE CENTRALIZED.
- (d) LOCALITIES MUST BE ORGANIZED FOR ALL-ROUND DEFENCE.
- (e) TROOPS INCLUDING ARMOUR MUST BE AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE AND DELIBERATE COUNTER-ATTACK.
- (f) OBSTACLES MUST BE COVERED FROM ENEMY RECONNAISSANCE.

38. Concealment of all troops in a defensive area requires great care in the selection, and preparation, of localities. It may entail restriction of movement by day. This is of first importance as, without a knowledge of the defensive lay-out, any enemy attack is made extremely difficult. To achieve concealment, infantry localities will often be best sited on reverse slopes.
39. An outpost screen of automatics and snipers, with artillery and mortar OPs, must cover the main defensive area and prevent enemy reconnaissance.
40. All artillery should be under centralized Corps control. This will enable the maximum fire to be brought down to smash an enemy attack in any sector.
41. All localities must be organized for all-round defence, so that they can hold out even if the enemy have over-run flanking localities and penetrated to the rear. Supporting arms should be included in infantry localities.
42. Reserves of infantry and tanks must be skilfully positioned ready to take instant action for immediate counter-attack. For this purpose squadrons or even troops of tanks will be positioned right forward in the areas of the forward battalions.
- A central reserve including armour must also be kept for deliberate counter-attack to recover vital ground, if it is lost.
- The difference between the immediate and deliberate counter-attack is entirely one of the time taken to mount the operation, and not of the size of the force involved.
- All counter-attacks should be worked out on the ground.

43. If obstacles are used to strengthen the defence, they should be covered by our own fire, and enemy reconnaissance of them prevented. An obstacle loses 50% of its value once the enemy can reconnoitre it.

THE ASSAULT LANDING ON AN ENEMY HELD COAST

44. These operations have certain special aspects, such as Naval Co-operation, but in general the principles underlying them are very similar to those which govern the forcing of a water obstacle.

The Basic Points

- (a) SPEED AND ORDER OF LANDING ARE THE FIRST ESSENTIALS.
- (b) LANDING BEACHES MUST BE FREED FROM OBSERVED SMALL ARMS FIRE.
- (c) LANDING BEACHES MUST BE JOINED UP.
- (d) ARMoured COLUMNS MUST BE PUSHED QUICKLY INLAND.
- (e) KEEP THE INITIATIVE.
45. It is most important to get enough infantry and supporting arms quickly on shore to withstand immediate counter-attack. This will depend largely upon sound preliminary planning. There will never be space for all you would like. Decide what is essential.
46. The rapid capture of the first infantry beachhead, and complete mopping up of all enemy in this area, must aim to free the landing places from small arms fire. The next step is to deny the enemy observation of them for his mortars and artillery.

47. The Division may land on a wide front at several beaches. Once these are firmly joined up, the enemy's chance of isolating them, and dealing with them in detail, has gone.
48. Boldness in pushing inland with infantry and tanks to seize important ground will prevent the enemy from developing his attack against the landing places.
49. The Commander must retain the initiative during the early fluid fighting. The enemy will then be forced to conform, and to use up his reserves piecemeal in stopping gaps, rather than concentrated against the beaches.

INFANTRY AND TANK CO-OPERATION

50. No tanks are included in the Infantry Division, but they will be required for close co-operation with infantry whenever the ground is suitable. They have a very high moral, as well as material, value. All Commanders must understand the principles which govern the employment of tanks and infantry together.

The Basic Points

51. (a) INFANTRY AND TANKS MUST "MARRY UP" EARLY.
 (b) TANK RECONNAISSANCE OF GROUND AND OBSTACLES IS NECESSARY BEFORE EVERY ATTACK.
 (c) THE FORMATION ADOPTED WILL DEPEND ON THE GROUND.
 (d) THE TANK IS AN OFFENSIVE ASSAULTING WEAPON.
 (e) GOOD INTER-COMMUNICATION BETWEEN TANKS AND INFANTRY IS ESSENTIAL.

(f) TANKS MUST HAVE TIME TO REPLENISH AMMUNITION AND FUEL, AND FOR MAINTENANCE.

52. Whenever possible an infantry unit should fight with the tank unit with which it has trained. In any case, the Commanders must be brought together as early as possible before any operation. The tank commander must be consulted at all stages of the plan to ensure that the role allotted to him is a suitable one, and to give his advice upon all the details of the plan from the tank point of view. It is equally important that subordinate commanders, and the rank and file, get to know each other.
53. Efficient support will depend upon tanks getting through, or round, any obstacles there are, and upon their being able to get over the country between the start line and the objective. Early reconnaissance by tank officers, who should accompany infantry patrols, will be necessary. The whole plan may depend upon the results of this reconnaissance. Nothing must be left to chance.
54. In open country tanks will usually lead on to the objective. In close country infantry must lead, closely supported by tanks.
55. The first task of the tank working with infantry is to destroy enemy unarmoured troops. Its use in a defensive role, to deal with enemy armoured attack, may sometimes be necessary but such use must be only temporary; the enemy tank is best destroyed by the anti-tank gun.
56. Good inter-communication between tanks and infantry is necessary in all stages of an operation. It presents considerable difficulties, and all possible means should be tried; these include R/T, remote control equipment, and pre-arranged signals with very lights or 2" mortar smoke.

57. There is a definite limit to the time tanks can remain in action; they must rally back to replenish ammunition and fuel. They also need regular periods for maintenance; lack of this will soon mean tanks out of action.

COMMAND AND INTERCOMMUNICATION

58. It is in this realm that the battle may well be won or lost.

The Basic Points

- (a) PERSONAL COMMAND.
- (b) GOOD COMMUNICATIONS.
- (c) A TIGHT GRIP ON THE TACTICAL BATTLE.

59. The Divisional Commander himself must always make the plan for any operation, leaving the details to be worked out as necessary by his staff.

60. When he has decided on his plan, he must ensure that he issues the necessary verbal orders in time for subordinate commanders to work out their own plans, and for the essential details to be known right down to the rank and file.

Every single soldier must know, before he goes into battle, how the little battle he is to fight fits into the larger picture, and how the success of his fighting will influence the battle as a whole.

61. Having made his plan, and issued his orders, the Divisional Commander must allow his subordinate commanders to fight their own battle.

He must avoid interfering with their detailed arrangements and cramping their action and initiative.

62. The staff and subordinate commanders of Divisions and Brigades must be trained to act on verbal orders

and instructions. A commander will best ensure that the spirit, as well as the letter, of his plan is fully understood if he issues his orders personally to his subordinates, and it should be his aim to do so on every possible occasion.

63. In fluid operations there will seldom be time for written confirmation of verbal orders. But written confirmation may be necessary in operations such as a setpiece attack, where a detailed fire plan is involved, or to ensure that any formations or units not represented at the Verbal Orders Group, such as a flanking Division, are fully in the picture.

64. All Commanders must be trained to make free use of R/T in mobile operations. It requires a nice judgment, and much practice, to decide when the urgency of an order, and the desirability of the Commander issuing it personally, justifies him in giving it out in clear over the air.

65. If Liaison Officers are used to convey the Commander's orders, they must be carefully selected.

They should have considerable military experience and sound judgment; they must be completely in the mind of the Commander; failing this, there is serious danger that they may misinterpret him.

66. Control in battle is largely dependent upon good communications. It is absolutely essential that these should be 100% efficient.

It is the responsibility of the Officer Commanding Divisional Signals to ensure that every measure has been taken to provide alternative means of communication between the Commander and his subordinate commanders and supporting arms.

The Divisional Commander has got to keep a tight grip on the tactical battle, and he cannot do this unless he knows what is going on. But he must not wait for information which may never arrive; he must go forward and find out the situation for himself.

TRAINING

67. Training is preparation for battle. All training must therefore be realistic, and connected directly in a man's mind with his conduct in battle.

When troops first go into action, much will depend not only on the soundness of their training, but even more on their ability to carry out in battle what they have learnt in training.

68. There are plenty of opportunities for training in any theatre of war, but they are often of a fleeting nature. In order to derive the maximum benefit from such training it is absolutely essential that it shall be properly organized.

69. A small central Divisional School will pay a good dividend. The Instructors must be carefully selected, preferably by the Commander personally, and they should be changed at frequent intervals.

Courses can be run to meet requirements as they vary from time to time.

It is no exaggeration to say that the success in battle depends greatly upon the ability of infantry junior leaders to lead and command. Casualties amongst these will always be high, and reinforcements will seldom contain a large enough proportion of them to fill the gaps.

Many private soldiers when they get into action will show the qualities of leadership, and short courses at the Divisional School will give them the necessary technical and tactical knowledge.

In addition NCOs who become "rusty" can be sent for refresher courses, and lessons of the campaign as they are learnt can be incorporated in the courses, and thus spread amongst the junior ranks of all units.

Other courses might include training of battalion signallers, OP parties from field regiments, Provost personnel, etc., to forestall shortages as they become probable.

Courses can also be run for Arms such as the Divisional RE, to deal with technical developments. Apart from its training side the Divisional School will be of great value in fostering the Divisional spirit and in providing a temporary change of atmosphere for officers and other ranks. They must be returned to their unit brimming over with enthusiasm.

The Divisional Commander should make this school his personal responsibility and pride.

70. It will at all times be possible to withdraw a Division for special training before a particular operation.

This training should be dealt with in three stages:—

(a) The individual and unit collective training of all Arms in the specialized requirements of the particular operation, i.e. assault boating for the crossing of a water obstacle, physical fitness and hill climbing in the case of a mountain operation, etc., etc.

(b) Sand-table discussions by the Divisional and Brigade Commanders with their subordinate commanders.

(c) A full scale rehearsal of the operation under conditions approximating as nearly as possible to those of the actual operation.

71. From time to time special conditions of country and enemy tactics will require a new technique to deal with them. The Divisional Commander should make every effort to disengage the necessary formation or unit from battle and, after working out the method to be employed, and holding sand-table discussions, give the troops concerned the opportunity to train on these lines before applying them in action.

72. When a Division is temporarily withdrawn from action the Commander should lay down the type of training which he wishes to take place, leaving it to his subordinate commanders to work out details.

A good maxim is "Don't attempt too much". It is far better to do a little thoroughly than a lot sketchily. It will pay to concentrate first on the training of officers and NCOs.

Short periods of close order drill should be included in the syllabus for all arms. These will do much to restore quickly any loss of smartness, and pride in personal turn-out and bearing.

ADMINISTRATION

73. The tempo of modern warfare, the quantity and variety of modern weapons, and the potential mobility provided by motor transport, make the success of operations, more than ever, dependent upon good administration.

74. To carry out any operation, a commander has certain resources. These are:—

- (a) The number of men available for the operation.
- (b) The physical ability of these men.
- (c) The mental ability of these men.
- (d) The material, arms, ammunition, vehicles, petrol, supplies of all kinds, with which these men will fight.

75. The object of all administration must be to ensure that the greatest value is obtained from each of these resources, and that together they form a balanced team, adequate for the task in hand.

76. Success does not happen; it is planned. In any operation the administrative aspect must be considered before the tactical plan is firm. The

Divisional Commander must bring his administrative staff into the picture right at the beginning.

77. Administrative problems will be many and varied. A too rigid organization will never solve varied problems; elasticity is required and must be developed, and this will be achieved only if administrative communications are adequate.

THE COMMANDER, THE STAFF, AND THE HEADS OF SERVICES

78. The Divisional Commander is responsible that the organization, training, and handling of his administrative staff and units, is as sound as that of his fighting units, and that his administrative arrangements are always in line with his tactical plan. This responsibility cannot be delegated.

79. Administration is, however, a mass of detail. The Commander must not get immersed in this; it is the responsibility of his AA & QMG.

80. The AA & QMG is therefore the Divisional Commander's mouthpiece to the heads of Services on all matters of administrative detail. The Commander must see his heads of Services periodically, and obtain from them a first-hand account of their activities. Such accounts must be of matters of policy, rather than of detail.

81. Heads of Services have a dual role, as advisers, and as Commanders. They must be given considerable freedom of action, and movement, if they are to carry out both efficiently.

82. The closest touch must be maintained between the 'G' and the 'A & Q' members of the staff. They must live, and work, together, and always be in the picture from the other's point of view.

ADMINISTRATIVE COMMAND

83. Operational command within the Division will change often, in accordance with the tactical requirements.

Administrative command should change as seldom as possible. It is best organized within the Division so that each arm is administered by its own HQ, i.e. Infantry battalions by their own Brigade HQ, all RA units by HQRA, all Medical units by ADMS, etc. By doing this the total "task" is spread evenly over many shoulders, and above all, continuity is achieved.

Only when a force of all arms is made up to operate independently of the Division, should administrative command change.

ECONOMY

84. Good administration is economical. Economy does not mean an all-round cut of 10%; it means the avoidance of waste.

85. Administrative plans are always subject to limitations either of transport, supplies, time or distance. The best possible use must therefore be made of everything, and conflicting requirements carefully balanced against each other.

86. Resources should be provided on an "as required for the operation" basis. The ruling factor must be "Is this item needed?" NOT "Am I entitled to this item?"

87. All demands must be accurate, timely, and the result of careful calculation. To over demand means either that you go short of something else, or that somebody goes short of what you have over demanded, or often both.

RESERVES

88. Except for such reserves as higher formations may order Divisions to hold for a specified task, the holding of reserves by Divisions is unnecessary and wasteful.

89. The habit of over-insurance, which leads to the retention of undisclosed reserves, is a sure sign of bad administration.

90. The surest way to prevent unauthorized reserves accumulating is to ensure that all concerned hold their immediate requirements and know that, when further stocks are required, they will be immediately available.

TRANSPORT

91. A Division has at its disposal a tremendous lift in MT. On the proper handling of this lift, according to the requirements of each operation, will depend much of the success of the administrative plan.

92. All transport in a Division is either "Fighting Transport" or "Load carrying Transport." The latter must not be regarded as permanently allotted. Full use must be made of its elasticity. A Division's requirements vary from day to day. The only "constant" is rations, which forms a relatively small fraction of the total daily lift.

93. Transport is provided to move whatever is required from A to B. Only certain commodities, and these in carefully calculated amounts, should be retained on wheels. The rest must be off-loaded to make the transport available for other duties.

If this is not done waste and delay will result, and the full power of the Division cannot be developed.

MORALE

94. Good administration will materially help to retain high morale in a Division.
The soldier who is well provided for, who is not disturbed by petty and unnecessary inconveniences, who knows that everything possible is being done for him, who is well clothed and well fed, is a contented soldier.

95. Both the Commander and his staff have great responsibilities in this respect. The latter must keep in close and constant touch with the troops, to ensure that all is well, and to hear at first hand if things go wrong.

96. Comradeship and team work are of enormous value in all units. If a man feels he is a stranger, his morale and fighting value will be low. A proper system to receive reinforcements to a Division is therefore most important.

Men will often arrive after a long and unpleasant journey to join a battalion of which they have never heard—in other words “browned off”. They must not go into battle till this has been put right.

A central Divisional organization for the reception of all reinforcements is the best solution. Here the “stranger” becomes a “member of the team”.

He will be taught amongst other things:—

- (a) Who his new unit is,
- (b) What it has done,
- (c) What his unit and Divisional signs are,
- (d) Who are the personalities of his unit, his Brigade and his Division, and be made to feel that they are *his*.

His equipment must be checked over, and made up if necessary, and he must be medically examined.

When the time is opportune, he must be delivered to his new unit. On no account should he join at a time when the stress of battle makes his unit too busy to “sort him out,” and so parks him in “B” echelon.

In short, to obtain the best value from a reinforcement, he must first be welcomed into his new team, and then immediately absorbed into it.

97. Morale suffers as a result of boredom. Boredom is usually caused by lack of variety, not by lack of anything to do. Baths, clean clothing, entertainment, newspapers and many little things, which good administration will provide, all kill boredom; but they must be properly organized. Entertainment, if a man misses his meal to see it, is of little value.

98. Letters from home play a great part in morale. There must be no unnecessary delay, either in the soldier receiving his letters, or in the letters he writes getting home.

A good delivery system, prompt censoring, and an accurate record for purposes of re-direction when a man leaves his unit, are all necessary.

99. Morale can be adversely affected by indiscriminate burials. Casual graves, scattered in ditches at the side of the road, must be avoided.

The establishment of a Divisional Cemetery, and proper and fitting burial of the dead, are most important.

B. L. M.

